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	America’s	Security	Does	Not	Depend	on	Military	Power	Alone		Thomas	C.	Bruneau			The	Trump	Administration	sent	its	proposed	budget	to	the	U.S.	Congress	on	March	16.		A	key	provision	of	the	budget	is	an	increase	in	the	Department	of	Defense	(DoD)	budget	by	$54	billion	dollars,	a	10%	increase.			At	the	same	time,	this	proposal	decreases	the	budget	of	the	State	Department	by	$10.1	billion,	or	28%.		This	ill-considered	maneuver	will	only	serve	to	increase	our	nation’s	insecurity.		Of	particular	concern	is	that	no	strategy	is	attached	to	the	DoD's	increased	funding.		Rather	than	a	strategy	or	plan,	the	basis	for	such	important	decisions	appears	to	be	political	or	even	personal.			 As	the	head	of	the	U.S.	Central	Command,	Marine	General	James	Mattis,	now	Secretary	of	Defense,	aptly	stated:		"if	you	don't	fully	fund	the	State	Department,	then	I	need	to	buy	more	ammunition."		With	a	relatively	modest	sum	of	$42.4	billion,	(representing	1.02%	of	the	total	federal	budget),	the	State	Department	seeks	to	maintains	a	global	environment	that	secures	the	U.S.	homeland,	our	representatives,	businesses	interests	abroad,	and	allies.		In	the	absence	of	economic	crises	or	other	large	scale	threats,	it	may	be	difficult	to	see	the	value	of	the	current	global	system	of	preventive	security.			 In	this	essay	I	call	attention	to	the	examples	of	Colombia	and	Mongolia.			Both	cases	illustrate	how	relatively	small	amounts	of	U.S.	assistance	helped	these	two	countries	strengthen	their	democracies	and	today	contribute	to	global;	and	U.S.	security.			These	two	cases	alone	provide	sufficient	evidence	to	justify	continued	support	for	U.S.	foreign	aid	or	foreign	cooperation.					 In	the	late	1990s,	Colombia	was	considered	a	"failed	state"	in	that	the	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces	of	Colombia	(FARC)	controlled	large	sections	of	the	country.		The	FARC	also	terrorized	much	of	Colombia	as	they	were	able	to	launch	terrorist	attacks	in	major	cities,	destroy	oil	pipelines	and	other	critical	infrastructure.		The	FARC	obtained	its	resources	from	the	sale	of	cocaine	and	ransoms	from	their	kidnapped	victims.	The	Colombian	Government	appeared	unable	to	stem	the	FARC	and	the	other	terrorist	organizations	that	copied	it	or	halt	the	export	of	illegal	drugs.			The	Colombian	Government	and	the	U.S	began	cooperation	for	security	and	development	assistance	through	Plan	Colombia.		This	arrangement	provided	$10	billion	dollars	in	assistance	from	2000	to	2016	mainly	through	Department	of	State,	DoD,	and	USAID.	With	the	use	of	that	money	the	Colombian	government	bolstered	its	military	capabilities,	its	policing	presence,	and	its	institutional	development	in	rural	areas.		The	strengthening	of	the	state	undermined	the	FARC's	arguments	
against	the	government.		In	2016	the	FARC	was	forced	to	negotiate	seriously,	something	they	refused	to	do	between	their	founding	in	the	early	1960s	and	2016,	and	disarm,	and	Colombia	has	now	combined	both	security	and	democracy.	Colombia	turned	the	tide	against	narco-terrorism,	communist	insurgency,	and	criminal	violence.		Colombian	institutions	have	become	so	proficient	in	the	areas	of	security,	counterinsurgency,	and	counter-kidnapping	operations	that	the	country	exports	security	expertise	to	other	U.S.	allies	in	fighting	organized	crime	and	the	extremely	violent	gangs	prevalent	in	Central	America	and	Mexico.		The	funds	provided	by	the	U.S.	are	approximately	15%	of	the	funds	that	Colombia	itself	raised,	mainly	by	a	war	tax	on	its	wealthier	citizens,	to	expand	and	professionalize	its	armed	forces	to	regain	its	sovereignty.			In	short,	U.S.	funds	were	in	support	of	Colombian	funds	and	their	military	and	police	forces	to	fight	the	terrorists.		The	example	of	Colombia	demonstrates	that	building	partner	capacity	works.				In	the	case	of	Mongolia,	when	the	country	became	fully	independent	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	the	early	1990’s,	the	U.S.	provided	various	forms	of	security	assistance,	mainly	in	the	form	of	low	cost	military	education	and	training.	Building	on	this	support,	Mongolia	emerged	as	a	vibrant	democracy,	located	between	two	nuclear-armed	authoritarian	states,	China	and	Russia.		Mongolia	became	a	model	for	other	former	Soviet	satellites	demonstrating	that	democracy	is	possible	and	is	not	determined	by	either	geography	or	relative	poverty.	Mongolia	has	repaid	the	U.S.	security	and	development	assistance	many	times	over	by	sending	troops	in	support	of	the	U.S.	military	and	policy	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	and	as	an	active	peacekeeper	in	conflict	zones	in	Kosovo	and	throughout	sub-Saharan	Africa.	With	U.S.	assistance,	in	2003	Mongolia	established	a	center	of	excellence	for	peacekeeping	which	became	the	only	place	on	earth	where	American,	Japanese,	South	Korean	and	NATO	forces	exercise	together	with	Chinese	Peoples	Liberation	Army	units	for	peacekeeping.		 The	tremendous	successes	in	Colombia	and	Mongolia,	combining	a	mixture	of	relatively	small	U.S.	programs,	is	the	model	of	how	our	country	leverages	U.S.	funds,	along	with	American	expertise,	to	assist	other	countries	in	providing	their	security	and	defense,	which	in	turns	increases	our	security	and	defense.	Most	of	the	programs	and	funding	are	built	on	models	of	shared	responsibility	of	Department	of	State	and	the	Department	of	Defense.		Further,	they	all	have	multiple	purposes.	These	programs	deal	with	a	huge	variety	of	challenges	or	threats	including	countering	illegal	drugs,	countering	nuclear	proliferation	and	global	terrorism,	assisting	in	the	development	of	security	and	defense	institutions,	training	peacekeepers	from	other	countries,	promoting	the	rule	of	law,	preparing	civilians	for	national	security	and	defense	leadership,	and	professionalizing	other	militaries.		In	sum,	there	are	a	huge	variety	of	programs	in	play	with	an	equally	tremendous	
overlap	in	roles	and	responsibilities,	mainly	involving	the	Department	of	State	and	Department	of	Defense.			 	
		 The	programs	comprising	the	security	assistance,	or	security	cooperation,	system	has	evolved	under	congressional	guidance	and	oversight	since	the	Second	World	War.		It	is	virtually	impossible	to	remove	the	Department	of	State	component	for	the	vast	majority	of	these	programs.		Therefore,	to	decrease	the	funding	of	the	Department	of	State	by	28%,	and	diminish	its	personnel,	puts	these	programs	at	risk.		In	simple	terms,	increasing	the	budget	of	the	Department	of	Defense	by	cutting	funding	to	the	Department	of	State	decreases	our	security.			 			 	 											 			 		 		
